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Abstract 
A-SMGCS is a modular system defined in the 
ICAO Manual on Advanced Surface Movement 
Guidance and Control Systems (A-SMGCS) [8]. 
Such systems aim to “maintain the declared surface 
movement rate under all weather conditions within 
the aerodrome visibility operational level (AVOL) 
while maintaining the required level of safety” [8]. 
With the complete concept of an A-SMGCS, air 
traffic controllers (ATCO), flight crews, and 
vehicle drivers are assisted with surface operations 
in terms of surveillance, control, routing/planning 
and guidance tasks. To harmonise the 
implementation of the first two levels of  
A-SMGCS, which focus on surveillance and 
conflict monitoring, and to further mature the 
necessary technology and operating procedures, the 
European Commission funded the project EMMA 
(European airport Movement Management by  
A-SMGCS) within the sixth framework 
programme. Within EMMA, A-SMGCS level 1&2 
systems were installed at three European mid-size 
airports: Milan-Malpensa, Prague-Ruzynĕ, and 
Toulouse-Blagnac. Technical and operational trials 
were conducted at all three sites to verify the 
technical performance against the requirements and 
to prove operational feasibility. Additionally, real-
time simulations were performed in order to tune 
parameters of the monitoring and alerting function 
and to also assess operational improvements under 
experimental conditions. This paper presents the 
EMMA validation approach, the main findings and 
results as well as lessons learnt of the first project 
phase (2004-2006).  
Introduction 
Following the EUROCONTROL Performance 
Review Report of 2005 [5] airport delays are a 
growing proportion of the total ATM delays. Nearly 
all European hubs and already some mid-size 
airports are on the list of the 15 most penalising 
airports in Europe, which together generate 77% of 
all airport ATFM delays.  
Extending existing airport infrastructure, e.g. 
by building new runways, is a very difficult and 
complex process associated with many restrictions. 
Therefore, the optimal usage of existing 
infrastructure more and more becomes a necessity. 
Despite the importance of optimal resource usage, 
flight deck operations on the ground are still not 
very sophisticated nowadays. Implementation of 
modern cockpit technology for surface operations 
lags behind the developments for other flight 
phases. “Seen and be seen” is still the most 
common practice on ground. After landing pilots 
have to navigate using paper maps and look out of 
the window to avoid other traffic. Above that 
ATCOs are performing the surveillance task mainly 
visually. Frequently, ATCOs are supported by 
surface movement radar (SMR) only giving them 
poor analogue radar plots with a lot of clutter and 
nuisance targets. As soon as the visual reference is 
impaired all surface operations are severely 
impacted by an increasing workload and a 
decreasing situation awareness of all participants, 
compromising safety and airport capacity and 
increasing delays. This leads to negative 
consequences for the approach areas and finally to 
unfavourable network effects in the overall air 
transport system.  
An A-SMGCS helps to overcome this poor 
situation. In its basic level 1 it provides the ATCOs 
with a display showing the complete traffic 
situation that includes the position of all aircraft and 
vehicle movements and their identification. Since it 
is assumed that each day in the US and Europe at 
least one runway incursion is occurring, which may 
lead to severe accidents, such as the Milan-Linate 
accident in 2001, in its level 2 the A-SMGCS 
provides the ATCO with an automatic runway 
incursion monitoring and alerting function.  
EMMA Project Background 
The EMMA integrated project is divided into 
two project phases, which are called EMMA 
(2004-2006) & EMMA2 (2006 - 2009), and is set 
within the Sixth Framework Programme of the 
European Commission Directorate General for 
Energy and Transport (DG-TREN). It looks at  
A-SMGCS as a holistic approach for changes in 
airport operations. It builds on the experiences of 
earlier projects such as ‘Operational Benefit 
Evaluation by Testing A-SMGCS’ (BETA) [11]. 
With BETA new technologies for data extraction, 
digitising, data fusion, data link and multilateration 
became available. Although A-SMGCS progressed 
from a demonstration status to a semi-operational 
system, the complete proof of benefit of A-SMGCS 
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was missing. Therefore, EMMA was launched to 
set the standards for A-SMGCS systems and their 
operational usage, safety and interoperability while 
also focussing on the benefit expectations. 
A-SMGCS Services (level 1&2) 
A complete A-SMGCS as described in [8] 
supports tower controllers, apron/ramp controllers, 
pilots, and vehicle drivers in an all-embracing 
manner with the following four functions: 
surveillance, control, routing/planning, and 
guidance. EMMA validation activities in their first 
project phase (2004 – 2006) focussed on the first 
two implementation levels, which correspond to a 
surveillance service and a runway safety net. These 
services currently have the highest level of 
maturity: 
Surveillance (level 1) 
Each individual aircraft is seamlessly tracked 
and identified from final approach until it reaches 
the parking position and, vice versa, from the gate 
or stand until leaving the CTR.  
Runway monitoring and alerting function (level 2) 
The level 2 implementation looks at an 
automated control service that helps controllers to 
detect potentially dangerous conflicts on runways 
and restricted area intrusions. The clear advantage 
of this approach is that it is pro-active and not re-
active. Preventing conflicts before they get 
imminent is obviously better than solving them 
under time pressure when they become obvious. 
Test Sites, Architecture and 
Operations 
A level 1&2 A-SMGCS system was installed 
at three European mid-size airports: Milan-
Malpensa, Toulouse-Blagnac, and Prague-Ruzynĕ 
(cf. Figure 1). With Milan and Toulouse operational 
shadow-mode trials were performed, whereas the 
ATCOs in Prague could even use the system within 
their regular working environment. Controllers 
were trained and certified to use the system fully 
operational.  
Multi sensor systems integrating ASR, SMR, 
MLAT, ADS-B, and special gap-fillers were 
installed and tuned at all sites. Figure 2 represents 
the general system architecture of a level 1&2 A-
SMGCS.  
A-SMGCS traffic situation displays (TSD) 
showing the complete traffic situation were 
installed at each controller working position. The 
ATCOs in Prague could use the TSD as a primary 
means for identification in all visibility conditions 
(A-SMGCS level 1). Furthermore, the  
 
  
 
Figure 1: Milan-Malpensa, Toulouse-Blagnac, 
and Prague Ruzynĕ from the bird’s perspective 
monitoring and conflict alerting function  
(A-SMGCS level 2) informed the ATCO in case of 
conflict situations like ‘stop bar crossings’, 
‘infringement of restricted areas’, or ‘runway 
incursion’. 
However, the role of the ATCO has not really 
to be changed with the implementation of an  
A-SMGCS level 1&2. The new source of 
surveillance information and conflict monitoring 
will complement the usual source for surveying the 
traffic. It is expected that the ATCOs’ situation 
awareness improves, which will be followed by an 
increase of safety and a more efficient control of 
the traffic. For instance, pilots’ position reports are 
no longer necessary, which reduces the load of the 
voice channel and taxi times will be reduced due to 
a better situation awareness of the ATCO. 
In addition to the operational field trials, real-
time simulation trials were conducted with Milan-
Malpensa and Prague ATCOs. This was necessary 
for tuning parameters of the ‘situation monitoring 
and conflict alerting’ function to the ATCOs’ needs 
and also assessing A-SMGCS level 1&2 
operational improvements under real experimental 
conditions. 
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Figure 2: General system architecture of a level 
1&2 A-SMGCS 
EMMA Verification & Validation 
Methodology testing an A-SMGCS 
The basic aim of the EMMA project was the 
verification and validation (V&V) of A-SMGCS 
(level 1&2) functionality as described in the ICAO 
Manual [8] and further refined in the Operational 
Requirements Document (ORD) of EMMA [3], 
which bases on the technical and operational 
functionality outlined in the official documents of 
the EUROCONTROL A-SMGCS project [1], [2].  
Before successful V&V takes place, 
verification, i.e. testing against system 
specifications should occur. Only if verification 
results in an A-SMGCS that performs at the 
required level, successful validation of the concept 
can be started.  
• Verification is testing against predefined 
technical requirements, (‘did we build the 
system right?’). 
• Validation is testing against operational 
requirements (‘did we build the right 
system?’). 
 
With EMMA V&V was split into four sub-
stages [15]. These are illustrated in the figure 
below. 
Operational Improvements
Operational Feasibility
Technical 
Tests
Operational Benefits
Verification
Validation
 
Figure 3: Stages of EMMA V&V activities 
The Technical Tests stage refers to the tests 
that must be conducted in order to assess the 
technical performance of A-SMGCS equipment. 
This stage answers the question: “What are the 
performances of the equipment?” 
The Operational Feasibility stage refers to 
the definition of the operational use of equipment 
and procedures, in accordance with the 
performances assessed in the previous stage. It 
answers the question: “Given the performances of 
the equipment, is it usable and acceptable?” 
The Operational Improvements stage refers 
to evidence of the operational improvements, in 
terms of safety, capacity, efficiency, and human 
factors, using the equipment and the procedures 
defined in the previous stage. It answers the 
question: “Given the accepted A-SMGCS 
equipment and procedures, how is ATM 
performance improved?” 
The Operational Benefits stage refers to the 
translation of operational improvements into terms 
of economical benefits. It answers the question: 
“What are the economic benefits for the purchasers 
and users of A-SMGCS products?”. This translation 
of operational effects into monetary values was out 
of the scope of EMMA and should be carried out by 
the respective stakeholders, since they are in a 
better position to do so.  
In general, it was expected that the validation 
exercises will demonstrate the operational 
feasibility of the A-SMGCS operational concept 
and that the concept provides a solution to the 
specific ATM problem and leads to operational 
improvements when comparing it to current 
SMGCS. 
Test Platforms 
Real-time simulations (RTS) in EMMA 
focussed on the operational feasibility of the 
‘monitoring and alerting’ function. The simulation 
test platforms were used to evoke safety critical 
events and to tune the system alerts to the needs of 
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the ATCOs. In addition, overall operational 
improvements in terms of safety and efficiency 
gains were to be proven with an RTS platform. 
On-site, V&V activities concentrated on the 
measurement of the technical performance by using 
test cars and/or automatic performance assessment 
tools. Operational feasibility of the whole system 
was subject of investigations with participation of 
the end users. Measuring operational improvements 
in the field, however, is very difficult or even 
impossible. Frequently, both users of the system 
and the system itself are not certified for full 
operational use. Furthermore, a valid baseline with 
ceteris paribus condition compared to the 
experimental condition (with A-SMGCS) does not 
exist. Weather, traffic mix, traffic amount or the 
runway in use change frequently and cannot easily 
be controlled. Any effects of an operational 
improvement are then overshadowed. However, if 
field trials show that the overall system meets the 
technical performance and is operationally feasible, 
then operational improvements, which are 
measured in the RTS, can be transferred to the real 
environment.  
Results 
The results are presented in accordance with 
the following main categories in the EMMA V&V 
methodology:  
• Technical Tests,  
• Operational Feasibility, and  
• Operational Improvements.  
 
Toulouse-Blagnac and Milan-Malpensa 
evaluated the A-SMGCS in on-site shadow-mode 
trials, which revealed important feedback to the 
technical and operational performance. Prague 
Ruzynĕ already started implementing an A-SMGCS 
within the BETA project, so that implementation 
and tuning of the system could start from a more 
matured level in EMMA. During the EMMA 
project Prague achieved the breakthrough to use the 
A-SMGCS fully operational under all visibility 
conditions. At the time of the validation activities, 
Prague controllers had already used the A-SMGCS 
for more than seven months and thus could give 
very detailed feedback regarding its operational 
feasibility and operational improvements. 
Therefore, validation results described in this paper 
mainly concentrate on results obtained at Prague 
Airport. 
Technical tests 
At the three test site airports the most 
important technical performance requirements of 
the surveillance and conflict detection function 
were assessed with the help of 18 verification 
indicators (see Table 1). These indicators were 
derived from the EMMA technical and operational 
requirement documents [6] [3], which again were 
based on the A-SMGCS ICAO Manual [8] and the 
EUROCAE ED-87A [4].  
The verification tests aimed at assessing the 
performance requirements by short- and long-term 
observations. Long-term measurements were 
performed by the recording and analysis tool 
MOGADOR, which was developed within EMMA 
(as described in [13]). The MOGADOR tool is a 
new verification tool, which fully automatically 
analyses specific surveillance performance 
parameters from a long-term recorded data pool of 
regular airport traffic. This tool revealed interesting 
results that can also be used to tune and adapt the 
A-SMGCS to meet the operational performance 
needs. However, long-term results analysed with 
MOGADOR lacked maturity because time was not 
sufficient to fully adapt the MOGADOR algorithm 
to the specific test airport characteristics, which 
would be necessary to automatically measure the 
real system performance. 
Prior to the long-term assessment, technical 
short-term tests were performed in order to assess 
the readiness of the A-SMGCS system and to verify 
the system’s compliance with the technical 
requirements (EMMA TRD [6]) by visual 
observation. Short-term test procedures leaned on 
EUROCAE [4] but were also adapted and improved 
within EMMA. They mainly make use of properly 
equipped test cars or test aircraft, knowing their 
own position on the aerodrome surface, which then 
is compared with the position assessed by the 
ground system. 
In Table 1 short- and long-term results of the 
technical performance tests carried out at Prague 
Airport are compared with the respective 
requirements.1  
Measured 
Value 
ID Indicator Acro-
nym 
Require
ment 
Short-
Term 
Long-
Term 
VE-1 Coverage 
Volume 
CV Approach 
Manoeuv. 
area 
Apron  
√ 
√ 
√ 
n.a. 
VE-2 Probability 
of 
Detection 
PD ≥ 99.9% 99.7% 97,1 – 
99,4% 
                                                          
1 For the technical results of the other sites and decisions 
about all other technical requirements the interested 
reader is referred to the EMMA V&V Analysis Report 
[16]. 
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Measured 
Value 
ID Indicator Acro-
nym 
Require
ment 
Short-
Term 
Long-
Term 
VE-3 Probability 
of False 
Detection 
PFD < 10E-3 
per 
Reported 
Target 
0.07% 0,04 – 
0,16% 
VE-4 Reference 
Point 
RP Not 
defined 
2-20 m n.a. 
VE-5 Reported 
Position 
Accuracy 
RPA ≤ 7.5 m  
at a conf. 
level of 
95% 
3.2 m 
(static) 
n.a. 
VE-6 Reported 
Position 
Resolution 
RPR ≤ 1 m  0.1 m n.a. 
VE-7 Reported 
Position 
Discrimi-
nation 
RPD Not 
defined 
Not 
tested 
n.a. 
VE-8 Reported 
Velocity 
Accuracy 
RVA Speed: 
≤5m/s 
Direction: 
≤10° at 
95% conf. 
1.2 m/s 
7.9° 
n.a. 
VE-9 Probability 
of Identifi-
cation 
PID ≥ 99.9% 
for 
identifiable 
targets 
99.7% 78,8 – 
94,1% 
VE-
10 
Probability 
of False 
Identifi-
cation 
PFID < 10E-3 
per 
Reported 
Target 
0.00% 3,2 – 
19,7% 
VE-
11 
Target 
Report 
Update 
Rate 
TRUR ≤ 1 s  
 
0.47s n.a. 
VE-
12 
Probability 
of 
Detection 
of an Alert 
Situation 
PDAS ≥ 99.9% 100% n.a. 
VE-
13 
Probability 
of False 
Alert 
PFA < 10E-3 
per Alert 
Insuffici
ent 
data 
n.a. 
VE-
14 
Alert 
Response 
Time 
ART ≤ 0.5 s  
 
<0.5 s n.a. 
VE-
15 
Routing 
Process 
Time 
RPT < 10 s n.a. n.a. 
VE-
16 
Probability 
of Conti-
nuous 
Track 
PCT Not 
specified 
n.a. See [9] 
§2.3.16
VE-
17 
Matrix of 
Detection 
MOD Not 
specified 
n.a. See [9] 
§2.3.17
Measured 
Value 
ID Indicator Acro-
nym 
Require
ment 
Short-
Term 
Long-
Term 
VE-
18 
Matrix of 
Identifi-
cation 
MOI Not 
specified 
n.a. See [9] 
§2.3.18
Table 1: Summery of Technical Verification 
Results (PRG) 
All main technical requirements could be 
verified (cf. EMMA V&V Analysis Report [16]) 
but also performance lacks were revealed. These 
lacks could either be overcome by a technical 
tuning of the system or simply showed the physical 
limits of the current technique. In some cases, when 
the user accepted a lower performance, they 
showed the inadequateness of the requirement. For 
example, VE-2 ‘Probability of Detection’ should be 
99.9% but only 99.7% was reached in Prague. 
Nevertheless, controllers’ acceptance of this lower 
level of performance finally led to the verification 
of the parameter.  
Operational feasibility  
The operational feasibility tests aimed at 
assessing the ATCOs’ acceptance of the EMMA 
operational procedures and requirements. It was 
expected that the operational feasibility of the 
system would be confirmed under all visibility 
conditions by using the procedures defined in the 
EMMA ORD [3]. The operational feasibility was 
assessed in RTS and on-site through intensive 
debriefing sessions with the ATCOs using specially 
prepared questionnaires. 
Real-time simulations 
In the Prague simulations a total of 11 
ATCOS in four groups participated in the RTS 
trials. Three traffic scenarios were generated in 
accordance with the three different visibility 
conditions (VIS1, VIS2, and VIS3), (cf. Table 2).  
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario°C 
RWY QFU ↑24 ↓31 ↑06 ↓13 ↑24 ↓24 
Approach ILS CAT I VOR/DME ILS CAT 
II/III 
Weather 
conditions 
VIS2 
Day  
Wind 350/10  
2km 
visibility 
VIS1 
Day 
Wind 130/15  
5km visibility  
 
VIS3 
Day 
Wind 350/10 
VRB/2 RVR  
400m visib. 
Movements ~ 35 / h ~ 41/ h ~ 25 / h 
Table 2: Traffic Scenarios with Prague RTS 
Each of the 11 ANS-CR ATCOs was given a 
30-item acceptance questionnaire after finishing all 
test runs. The Questionnaire mainly addressed the 
- 6 - 
use of the A-SMGCS HMI and new procedures, but 
also included items to the performance of the 
runway monitoring and alerting function. The 
answering scale reached from 1 “strongly disagree” 
to 10 “strongly agree”. Except for two items all 
statements were answered towards the expected end 
of the scale and a t-test with an error probability of 
α = 0.05 proved their significance2. Therefore, it 
can be stated that the use of the A-SMGCS HMI 
and the performance of automatic alerts were of 
high operational feasibility in the Prague RTS. 
Supplementing the Prague RTS by a second 
airport environment, another industrial system 
solution, with ENAV ATCOs as subjects, a second   
series of RTS for the Milan-Malpensa environment 
were performed at the NARSIM-Tower simulator 
of NLR in Amsterdam. The experiments also 
focussed on verifying technical performance and 
evaluating operational improvements related to the 
integration of a monitoring and alerting system into 
the current operational environment (baseline 
scenario). The ad hoc validation plan described 
both nominal and non-nominal validation sessions. 
The experiment scenarios discerned three major 
conditions: Medium or high-level traffic volumes, 
under different visibility conditions (VIS-1 and 
VIS-2), and with or without support of an A-
SMGCS. Feasibility checks with ENAV controllers 
in RTS had to confirm the pre-configured system 
parameters and indicate unexpected behaviour of 
the tool or malfunctions in order to ensure that the 
installed system was fit for more performance-
oriented validation activities. 
Field trials 
During the EMMA operational field trials in 
Prague a total of 15 ANS-CR ATCOs filled in the 
debriefing questionnaire. All 15 ATCOs had 
worked with the A-SMGCS for more than seven 
months at the time of the interviews. A debriefing 
questionnaire with 144 items was handed out after 
their regular shift. 98 of the 144 items referred to 
the “operational feasibility” questions/statements, 
which were segregated into five areas:  
• General usability  
• Surveillance service  
• Control service  
• HMI design  
• Procedures 
  
The items could be answered on a scale from 
1 (disagreement) to 6 (agreement). One-sample t-
tests with an expected mean value of 3.5 and an 
error probability of α = 0.05 were applied to prove 
statistical significance for all items.  
                                                          
2 The complete results can be found in the Prague Test 
Report D6.3.1 [9].  
The results revealed that the controllers 
accepted the A-SMGCS and thus approved its 
“operational feasibility”. The following items are 
typical examples of the 98 ‘feasibility’ items that 
were given to the ATCOs (all results to be found in 
[9]): 
• VA-03 Surveillance: “When visual 
reference is not possible, the displayed 
position of the aircraft on the taxiways is 
accurate enough to exercise control in a 
safe and efficient way.” (Mean (M) = 5.4; 
p = 0.00*3), or 
• VA-16 Surveillance: “I think that the  
A-SMGCS surveillance display could be 
used to determine that an aircraft has 
vacated the runway.” (M = 5.3; p = 
0.00*), or 
• VA-79 Control: “The information 
displayed in the A-SMGCS is helpful for 
avoiding conflicts.” (M = 5.1; p = 0.00*), 
or 
• VA-75 HMI: “The A-SMGCS provides 
the right information at the right time.”  
(M = 5.1; p = 0.00*), or 
• VA-55 Procedures: “When visual 
reference is not possible I think the A-
SMGCS surveillance display can be used 
to determine if the runway is cleared to 
issue a landing clearance.”  
(M = 5.3; p = 0.00*) 
 
In total 77 of the 98 items proved their 
significance in the expected direction. Most of the 
non-significant VA ‘feasibility’ items referred to 
the monitoring and alerting function whereas the 
ATCOs could not use the full scope of this service 
yet but only the “stop bar crossing” alerts as a first 
step. However, additional case studies with flying  
test aircraft, which were used to evoke additional 
conflict situations (e.g. arrival-arrival conflicts with 
crossing runway), showed that also the performance 
of other conflict situation alerts was highly 
accepted by the controllers during the field trials. 
Operational improvements 
Real-time simulations 
With EMMA, high-level and low-level V&V 
objectives were formulated and translated into 
measurable indicators. Table 3 gives an overview of 
the operational improvements that were intended to 
be measured with real-time simulation exercises. 
The ATCOs worked alternately with A-SMGCS 
and with their current SMGCS, which served as the 
baseline condition. By comparison of those two test 
conditions, operational improvements of the  
A-SMGCS could be assessed. 
                                                          
3 A star (*) signals statistical significance with p < 0.05. 
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High-level 
Objective 
Low-level 
Objective 
Indicator 
Reduced number of 
incidents and 
accidents  
Number of 
incidents and 
accidents 
Safety 
Faster identification 
and mitigation of 
safety hazards 
Time for conflict 
detection, 
identification, 
and resolution 
Lower Taxi Time 
for in and outbound 
traffic 
Taxi Time Efficiency/ 
Capacity 
Lower duration of 
radio com 
Duration of radio 
communications 
(R/T load) 
Higher Situation 
Awareness 
Situational 
Awareness 
Human 
Factors 
Convenient level of 
workload 
Workload 
Table 3: Measurements in RTS  
In the following the most interesting results 
are reported in accordance to the abovementioned 
indicators (cf. Table 3): 
Number of incidents and accidents 
No accidents were observed during the RTS 
trials. Incidents occurred but they were caused by 
the pseudo-pilots and thus were not human errors in 
terms of ATCO mistakes. In general, natural ATCO 
errors are very rare and thus hard to assess in test 
trials. 
Time for conflict detection, identification, and 
resolution 
The reaction time was assessed by an observer 
who measured the time between the initiation of a 
conflict and the reaction of the ATCO in charge. 
The reaction of an ATCO was defined by the time 
when the ATCO contacts the pilots to resolve the 
conflict. Pilots in the simulation were not real pilots 
but pseudo-pilots. They were instructed to cause 
conflict situations.  
Prague RTS results showed an improvement 
of 11.5% in the ‘reaction time’ of the Tower 
Executive Controller (TEC) between A-SMGCS 
and the baseline condition even if statistical 
significance (M = -0.69 seconds, T(12) = -0.560, p > 
0.05) could not be achieved. However, an important 
trend was discovered that showed that ATCOs react 
faster in the A-SMGCS condition (cf. Figure 4).  
6
5,31
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Reaction Time ATCO
[sec]
Baseline
A-SMGCS
 
Figure 4: ATCO’s reaction time in case of 
conflict situations 
Taxi Time 
The taxi time was measured automatically for 
each aircraft starting from the gate (velocity > 0 
kts) until the wheels left the ground (take-off) for 
outbound movements. For inbound movements the 
time measurement started when the wheels touched 
the ground (touch down) until the velocity was 0 at 
the gate or stand. Since identical traffic scenarios 
were used for A-SMGCS and baseline trials4, pairs 
of identical taxiing aircraft within identical traffic 
scenarios could be generated. This procedure 
guaranteed that measured taxi time differences 
could be attributed to better efficiency of  
A-SMGCS. 
With Prague RTS, pairs of “taxi times” were 
summed up for each scenario A, B, and C and 
separated in A-SMGCS and baseline condition. The 
results showed significant differences in the taxi 
times between A-SMGCS and the baseline 
condition: MTotal = -30 seconds, T(178) = 1.973,  
p < .05. This mean value corresponds to an effect of 
5.5%.  
540 510
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Average Taxi Time [sec]
Baseline
A-SMGCS
 
Figure 5: Average taxi times 
Since the aircraft, controlled by pseudo-pilots, 
always have a constant speed level, those taxi time 
differences can only be interpreted as being caused 
by a more efficient control by the ATCOs using A-
SMGCS. The detailed results also revealed that the 
                                                          
4 with the exception that call signs were changed to 
alleviate recall effects with controllers 
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taxi time effect is particularly high with scenario B 
(nearly 18%) where visibility is good but the 
amount of traffic is the largest. Finally, it must be 
stated: Yes, A-SMGCS reduces taxi times. 
Duration of radio communications 
The duration of radio communication was 
measured for each controller working position, 
Tower planning-, Tower executive-, and ground 
executive controller (TPC, TEC, and GEC). The 
durations refer to 3600 seconds overall test time. 
Figure 6 outlines the respective results. 
576 522
1764
1413
1560
1363
0
600
1200
1800
2400
3000
3600
TPC TEC GEC [sec]
Baseline
A-SMGCS
 
Figure 6: Duration of radio communication for 
three controller working positions 
A two-way 2x3 ANOVA showed a difference 
of 162 seconds between A-SMGCS and baseline, 
which revealed a positive trend but did not become 
significant (F(1, 30) = 3.6, p > 0.05). However, a p-
value of 0.06 is rather close to significance and with 
a greater sample size the effect should be proven.  
Situation awareness (SA) 
After each test run the ATCO’s situation 
awareness was measured with the SASHA 
questionnaire. The questionnaire uses a five-point 
scale and contains 12 questions, of which the last 
one addresses SA globally: "How would you rate 
your overall situation awareness during this 
exercise?” All ratings were merged into two scores 
per controller, one for the A-SMGCS and one for 
the baseline condition (cf. Figure 7).  
4,08
4,59
1
2
3
4
5
SASHA Item 12
Baseline
A-SMGCS
 
Figure 7: ATCOs’ Situation Awareness 
A t-test with repeated measurements showed 
the significance of this expected result (T(10) = 3.0, 
p < 0.05): Yes, A-SMGCS increases the ATCOs 
situation awareness. 
Workload 
In every test run each ATCO was asked to 
indicate the perceived workload rating every 10 
minutes. The controller could choose one of five 
categories: underutilised, relaxed, comfortable, 
high, or excessive. The mean values were analysed 
in a 2x3 (A-SMGCS x Scenario) ANOVA with 
repeated measurements on all independent factors. 
The ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of  
A-SMGCS (F(1,10) = 0.019; p = 0.89) with a mean of 
M = 2.285 compared to the baseline mean of  
M = 2.276 on a scale reaching from 1 to 5. Most of 
the time the controllers felt relaxed and comfortable 
in the simulation runs, notwithstanding the test 
condition A-SMGCS or baseline. Traffic scenarios 
were not demanding enough to put stress on the 
controllers, not even in the baseline condition. 
Therefore, A-SMGCS had no chance of showing a 
workload reduction. 
Field Trials 
Because of the laboratory conditions of a 
simulation platform, operational improvements 
were mainly assessed there. Nevertheless 
operational improvements could also be deduced 
from interviews with active ATCOs after their 
regular shifts using an A-SMGCS. The Prague 
ATCOs were asked to estimate their perceived 
safety and efficiency when they worked with  
A-SMGCS compared to earlier times when they 
could not use the new system. As already outlined 
above, a questionnaire containing 144 items was 
handed out to the ATCOs. 46 items referred to 
operational improvements in terms of safety, 
efficiency, and human factors.  
In the following, an excerpt of the most 
interesting answers to the 46 items is given5. The 
answering scale reached from 1 (disagreement) to 6 
(agreement) and one-sample t-tests with an 
expected mean value of 3.5 and an error probability 
of α = 0.05 were applied to prove statistical 
significance for all items: 
• VA-28 Safety: “When procedures for 
LVO are put into action, A-SMGCS helps 
me to operate safer.” (M = 5.4; p = 
0.00*), or 
• VA-62 Safety: “I think A-SMGCS can 
help me to detect or prevent runway 
incursions.” 
(M = 5.0; p = 0.00*), or 
• VA-09 Efficiency: “When visual 
reference is not possible, I think 
identifying an aircraft or vehicle is more 
                                                          
5 For the complete results, please have a look at the 
EMMA V&V Analysis report [16]. 
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efficient when using the surveillance 
display.” (M = 5.2; p = 0.00*), or 
• VA-10 Efficiency: “I think, also in good 
visibility conditions, identifying an 
aircraft or vehicle is even more efficient 
when using the surveillance display.” (M 
= 5.2; p = 0.00*), or 
• VA-28 Efficiency: “The A-SMGCS 
enables me to execute my tasks more 
efficiently.”  
(M = 5.4; p = 0.00*), or 
• VA-28 Efficiency: “The number of 
position reports will be reduced when 
using  
A-SMGCS (e.g. aircraft vacating runway-
in-use.” (M = 5.4; p = 0.00*), or 
• VA-124 Efficiency: “The A-SMGCS 
enables me to handle more traffic when 
visual reference is not possible.” (M = 
4.5; p = 0.00*), or 
• VA-12 Human Factors: “The A-SMGCS 
display gives me a better situational 
awareness.”  
(M = 5.4; p = 0.00*), or 
• VA-59 Safety: “When procedures for 
LVO are put into action, A-SMGCS helps 
me to reduce my workload.” (M = 5.2; p = 
0.00*). 
 
In total 38 of the 46 items proved their 
significance in the expected direction. The eight 
non-significant items mainly related to ambitious 
capacity effects, where the ATCOs could not 
imagine that an A-SMGCS level 1&2 system could 
already solve those problems. However, the 
majority of the answers further support the 
hypothesis that A-SMGCS provides significant 
operational improvements that will result in 
operational benefits for all stakeholders of an  
A-SMGCS.  
Transition of Results in detailed 
Recommendations 
The following summarising statements 
contain the most important recommendations 
obtained from the EMMA V&V activities (cf. also 
the EMMA Recommendation Report [10]): 
• It was proven that the ATCOs can use the  
A-SMGCS surveillance display as a primary 
means for identification, as it provides an 
identification label for every Mode-S6 
equipped aircraft. 
                                                          
6 Or any kind of equivalent tool that provides co-
operative data exchanges between aircraft and the ground 
surveillance system (e.g.; ADS-B) 
• It is recognised that flight crews do not comply 
with the transponder operating procedures 
consistently even when they are published by 
AIS and are known to the airlines. It is 
recommended to include type specific 
procedures in the pre-flight preparation 
procedures/checklists and in the aircraft 
operations manual to further improve pilots’ 
compliancy. 
• The use of a standardised and well proven 
validation approach is required for achieving 
reliable and robust V&V results. The use of the 
MAEVA VGH [14] with its stepped evaluation 
view within EMMA V&V contributed 
substantially to the production of reliable 
validation results. In future validation projects, 
the European Operational Concept Validation 
Methodology (E-OCVM, [12]) should be 
consulted as well. 
• The tuning of a runway monitoring and alerting 
function in simulation before running it 
operationally is a compulsory step to assure its 
operational feasibility in terms of safety and 
efficiency. 
• Some performance requirements are difficult to 
measure and verify by short-term testing only. 
Results are highly dependent on the 
measurement method and there are significant 
temporal variations. The EMMA tests indicate 
that verification of such requirements calls for 
continuous long-term observation over a period 
of several weeks. Automatic assessment tools, 
like MOGADOR, may help here.  
• Due to a high number of site specificities 
extensive tuning is a compulsory step to obtain 
a sufficient and reliable system performance. 
• In order to use the surveillance display safely and 
efficiently in all visibility conditions, all 
aircraft and vehicle movements, that intend to 
get authorised to use the manoeuvring area, 
should be properly equipped to be co-operative 
to an A-SMGCS in order to provide their 
identity on the ATCO’s surveillance display. 
Conclusion and Outlook 
EMMA phase 1 (2004 – 2006) was a project, 
which was founded to set the last bricks in the wall 
of a validated and consolidated A-SMGCS level 
1&2 concept for support of harmonised, worldwide 
implementation. This effort was performed in close 
co-ordination with EUROCONTROL’s A-SMGCS 
project being based on a common level 1&2 
concept. Within EMMA, level 1&2 systems were 
implemented at three European mid-size airports to 
perform extensive trials leading to meaningful 
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results, which should further support, improve, and 
finally validate the existing concept. The authors of 
this paper did not attempt to fully cover all facets of 
the EMMA activities but they tried to provide an 
overview of the EMMA strategy and the most 
meaningful project results.  
At three test sites the system performance was 
measured and verified against ICAO [8] 
requirements. System performance and new 
procedures were assessed for their operational 
feasibility and their effects on operational 
improvements. Finally, all results yielded feedback 
for ICAO requirements (see EMMA V&V analysis 
report [16] for the complete feedback). 
The mentioned results regarding operational 
feasibility and improvements were obtained in real-
time simulations and field trials. Simulation 
experiments proved the feasibility of new 
procedures, the A-SMGCS HMI, and the runway 
monitoring and alerting function. They showed 
operational improvements in terms of a lower 
duration of radio communication, a faster ATCO 
reaction time in case of conflict situations, an 
improved situation awareness of the ATCOs, and a 
significant reduction of the average taxi times by 
5,5%. In field trials, standardised interviews with 
active ATCOs using the A-SMGCS at Prague 
airport confirmed the operational improvements.  
Those improvements with more efficient and 
safer surface operations will finally result in 
operational benefits for all stakeholders of an 
airport and will provide important input for an  
A-SMGCS business case. 
EUROCONTROL in co-operation with the 
European Commission presented results of EMMA 
and the EUROCONTROL A-SMGCS project to the 
European Air Navigation Planning Group 
(EANPG). They presented a formal proposal to 
update the ICAO A-SMGCS manual [8] and to 
amend the Regional Supplementary Procedures 
(SUPPS) (Doc 7030, [7]). These activities are still 
ongoing. 
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Abbreviations 
ADS-B Automatic Dependent Surveillance 
Broadcast 
AIP Aeronautical Information Publication 
AIS Aeronautical Information Service 
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ANOVA Analysis of Variance 
ANS-CR Air Navigation Services of the Czech 
Republic 
A-SMGCS Advanced Surface Movement Guidance 
and Control System 
ASR Approach Surveillance Radar 
ATCO Air traffic controller 
ATFM Air Traffic Flow Management 
ATM Air Traffic Management 
AVOL Aerodrome visibility operational level 
BETA operational Benefit Evaluation by Testing 
A-SMGCS 
CEC Clearance Executive Controller 
CTR Control Tower Region 
CWP Controller Working Position 
DG-TREN Directorate General Transport and Energy 
DLR Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und 
Raumfahrt 
EANPG European Air Navigation Planning Group 
EMMA European airport Movement Management 
by A-SMGCS 
GEC Ground Executive Controller 
GND Ground 
HMI Human Machine Interface 
ILS Instrumental Landing System 
M Mean 
MAEVA Master ATM European Validation Plan 
MLAT Multilateration 
MVP Machine Vision Processor 
NARSIM NLR ATC Research Simulator 
NLR National Aerospace Laboratory of the 
Netherlands 
ORD Operational Requirements Document 
P Error probability 
RDPS Radar Data Processing System 
RTS Real Time Simulation 
RWY Runway 
SA Situation Awareness 
SASHA Situation Awareness in the SHAPE project 
SDS Surveillance Data Server 
SMR Surface Movement Radar 
SQB Squitter Beacons 
TARMAC Taxi And Ramp Management And Control 
TEC Tower Executive Controller 
TLX Task Load Index 
TPC Tower Planning Controller 
TRD Technical Requirements Document 
TSD Traffic Situation Display 
TWY Taxiway 
V&V Verification and Validation 
VA VAlidation item number 
VE VErification item number 
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